We consider a finite-horizon market-making problem faced by a dark pool that executes incoming buy and sell orders. The arrival flow of such orders is assumed to be random and, for each transaction, the dark pool earns a per-share commission no greater than the half bid-ask spread. Throughout the entire period, the main concern is inventory risk, which increases as the number of held positions becomes critically small or large.
Introduction
Market makers are liquidity providers. They set bid and ask quotes and trade with impatient investors who seek to immediately buy or sell a certain quantity of a stock by market orders.
The market maker is willing to hold a non-zero inventory while earning the spread from each transaction. Holding a non-zero inventory carries an intrinsic risk associated to the unpredictable changes to which the stock price is subject. This risk is further increased by a potential information asymmetry due to which the market maker trades in the wrong direction.
In this paper we consider the optimal management of a dark pool inventory and the pool's role as a market maker. A dark pool is an alternative trading venue where participants do not release their identity and benefit of advantageous prices. While optimalliquidation problems involving dark pools have been treated in recent works by, e.g., Kratz 2015), as far as we know dark pools have not been studied in a market-making context elsewhere. In our situation the dark pool (i) executes incoming buy and sell orders posted by its clients and (ii) may post limit and market orders in a lit pool to control the level of its inventory. This view can be justified by the increasing competition between dark platforms and the reputational benefit deriving from the speed of execution and price advantage. Also, by executing large orders placed by its (institutional) clients, the dark pool acquires "reserved" information about the traded asset. Furthermore, the dark pool would rather avoid the situation where an investor (client) resorts to the lit pool and thus potentially moves the price against the dark pool's holding. We formulate a double-obstacle impulse-control problem and we use the viscosity theory to characterise the solution of the associated system of quasi variational inequalities (QVIs). We refer the reader to Crandall Previous work on market making includes Amihud & Mendelson (1980) who, based on Garman (1976) , relate the bid-ask prices to the share holding of a risk-neutral agent.
They find a relationship between the optimal quotes and the distance from the "preferred" inventory position. Stoll (1978) considers a two-period model in which a risk-averse agent supplies liquidity and maximises his expected utility. Ho & Stoll (1981) use the dynamic programming principle (DPP) to obtain the optimal quotes which maximise the terminal wealth in a single-dealer market. The recent evolution in financial markets, arisen with algorithmic and high-frequency trading, has shifted the optimal market-making problem to an order-driven market environment where optimal quotes and trading strategies are computed and submitted by electronic machines. For example Avellaneda & Stoikov (2008) adapt the market-making framework by Ho & Stoll (1981) to a limit order book (LOB).
They consider the maximisation of the agent's expected terminal wealth and consider both, the finite and the infinite-time cases. They model the arrival of buy and sell orders by Poisson processes and the dynamics of the mid-price by an arithmetic Brownian motion.
They find the HJB PDE by means of the DPP and propose an approximation of the optimal quotes via asymptotic expansions. This type of problem has been investigated elsewhere, too. The works by Cartea & Jaimungal (2012) on risk metrics and by Cartea et al. (2013 ) consider ambiguity and self-exciting processes, respectively. Guéant et al. (2013) deal with the inventory risk and reduce a complex optimisation problem to a system of ODEs. Guilbaud & Pham (2013) consider a market maker who continuously submits limit orders at the best quoted prices and resorts to market orders when the inventory becomes too large. They numerically solve a finite-time impulse-control problem and find the optimal order sizes and quotes to be posted in the lit pool.
The paper is organised as follows. After the introduction, in Section 2, we present the inventory and cash processes of the dark pool and we describe its trading strategies. In Section 3, the optimisation problem is introduced and, by making use of DPP, we derive the HJB equation. Section 4 is devoted to a numerical analysis of the dark pool strategies. All propositions, necessary to characterise the value function by the unique viscosity solution of the system of QVIs, and their proofs can be found in the appendix.
Dark pool as a market maker
We consider a dark pool that executes incoming buy and sell orders by its clients over a finite period of time 0 ≤ t ≤ T < ∞ and that may resort to the lit pool if its inventory becomes critically small or large. As a reward for the service provided, the dark pool chooses a per-share commission δ a for sell orders and δ b for buy orders, which shall not exceed the lit-pool half spread. The dark-pool order flow is affected by changing δ a and δ b . We may assume for example that the dark pool has a positive inventory at time u ∈ [t, T ]. It can make buy orders more attractive than sell orders, so to rebalance its position on the stock.
In particular, by setting δ b close to the mid-price and δ a far away from the mid-price (close to the best bid price), it encourages buy orders while sell orders are discouraged. At each time u ∈ [t, T ], we thus consider three options for the inventory management: i) the dark pool's order flow may be controlled by optimally choosing the per-share commission size, ii) a limit order-of which execution is uncertain-is posted in the lit pool , or iii) a costly market order is submitted to the lit pool. Our goal is to obtain the critical levels of the inventory for which market orders or limit orders are optimal.
We fix a filtered probability space (Ω, , { u } 0≤u≤T , ) satisfying the usual conditions and augmented by all -null sets. We model the LOB bid-ask half spread by a continuous-time Markov chain {k(u)} t≤u≤T with discrete state space := {0, δ, 2δ . . . nδ}. The chain is generated by {Q} = (r i j ) such that [k(u + du) = j|k(u) = i] = r i j du and [k(u + du) = i|k(u) = i] = 1 + r ii du, with r i j ≥ 0 for all j = i and r ii = − j =i r i j . The LOB mid-price is defined by
T ], the best bid and ask prices are given by S b (t 1 ) = S(t 1 ) − k(t 1 ) and S a (t 1 ) = S(t 1 ) + k(t 1 ), respectively.
We let a and b be + ∪ {0}-valued i.i.d. random variables with finite second moment.
These variables model the size of incoming sell and buy orders in the dark pool. We define the inventory process {X (u)} t≤u≤T by
, respectively. We allow for short-selling and thus, at any time u ∈ [t, T ], we have sign[X (u)] = {−1, 0, 1}. Furthermore, we model the cash process {Y (u)} t≤u≤T by 
The analogous holds for incoming sell orders. For technical reasons, we consider a bounded domain for both, the inventory and the cash processes, by letting (x, y) ∈ ⊂ 2 .We let :
, where X , X , Y , and Y are real-valued constants. Such an assumption is supported by the following financial interpretation: the market maker, i.e. the dark pool, is subject to regulations constraints (e.g. internal riskmanagement) which make it hard to hold or short-sell an amount of shares bigger than a fixed authorised quantity. Also, the market maker exits the market whenever the cash process has reached either the lower bound (bankruptcy) or an upper bound (gains target).
The dark pool can resort to the lit pool to liquidate (respectively refill) part of the inventory;
we assume that it can not post speculative orders. This means that at time u ∈ [t, T ] a buy order can be posted only if X (u) < 0 while a sell order can be posted if X (u) > 0.
Limit orders strategy
The dark pool (market maker) can post a limit order by specifying a quantity η and a limit price S ± (k + κ), where κ is the optimal distance from the best price, at which it wants to buy or sell. We only consider immediate-or-cancel orders and we model their execution percentage by a [0, 1]-valued random variable z. In particular, if a limit order is posted at time τ j , for j = 1, 2 . . . , then it impacts the inventory and the cash processes as follows:
(2.4)
For a limit buy order, the function Γ is non-negative valued and the function χ is nonpositive valued. In fact, a limit buy order, if executed, increases the inventory and reduces the cash amount. The contrary holds for limit sell orders. We will state these assumptions rigorously in the appendix. We let T be the set of stopping times not greater than T, and be the set of all admissible control actions. A limit-order strategy is a collection of stopping
Market orders strategy
Alternatively, the market maker can submit a market order, which (i) is more expensive and (ii) benefits of sure execution as it is matched with existing limit orders. A market order of size ξ i posted at a time ρ i impacts the inventory and cash processes as follows
For a market buy order, the function Λ is non-negative and the function c is non-positive.
The contrary holds for market sell orders. A market-order strategy is a collection of stopping
Optimisation problem and viscosity solution
We consider the problem of maximising expected terminal cash subject to total liquidation (the problem is the same for a pre-specified non-zero terminal inventory) of the remaining inventory via a market order. In defining the objective function, we are led by Guilbaud & Pham (2013). We let the stopping time τ * be the first time the state variables exit the set , such that
We define the value function by
, the function U is the time-τ * liquidation revenues and g is a running penalty for the risk of holding the inventory. In particular, (i) if g is negative-valued, the dark pool is risk-averse, (ii) if g is equal to zero, then it is risk-neutral, and (iii) if g is positive, then the dark pool is risk-prone. In the summations we include the penalties for trading in the lit pool, where ε m > ε l > 1. Throughout the paper we write, whenever possible, the vector of state variables x := [x, y, s] ∈ × + =: and we let τ * be the set of all stopping times less than τ * . Equation (3.1) satisfies the DPP, see Fleming & Soner
This is an optimal double-obstacles impulse control problem. We define the non-local operators and , for limit and market orders respectively, by
We define the operator
The value function V (t, x ; k) satisfies the QVI system 
and an impulse takes place. We thus consider intervention times (τ j and ρ i ) and impulses (η j and ξ i ) by which the dark pool can control the evolution of the state variables X (u) and Y (u). For this purpose, we define the continuation region (CR), the limit orders impulse region (L I) and the market orders impulse region (M I) by
For each k ∈ , let us consider the upper and lower semi-continuous envelopes of the In assumption (h), g(u, x) = 0 means that the dark pool is risk-neutral. Moreover, given the choice of the function U, it seeks to maximise the terminal cash amount, subject to full liquidation of its inventory via a market order. Let us fix t = t 0 < t 1 < t 2 < · · · < t N = T to be an equally-spaced partition of the time interval T − t, such that t i+1 − t i = ∆ > 0 for i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1. We define the observed inventory and cash processes by
In the case that trades are executed only within the dark pool, the value function of the thus uncontrolled problem simplifies to
Next, we introduce the possibility of submitting unit-sized market and limit orders in the lit pool. At each time t i , the dark pool checks whether it is more convenient to (i) execute trades in the dark pool only, (ii) submit a market order such that
where ξ(t i ) = {+1, −1} and ε m > 0, or (iii) submit a limit order such that 
be respectively the number of market sell (MS), market buy (MB), limit sell (LS) and limit buy (LB) orders submitted in
We say that two strategies Q 1 and
We have n * = 1 The situation can be summarised as follows: we have four objects and n − 1 slots. We need to count how many combinations we may have, including repetitions, provided that the order does not count and some slots may stay empty. Such number n * is readily obtained:
(n + i).
By the DPP, we can solve the above problem by means of backward recursion. In particular, let Q be the optimal strategy for the interval [T − (n − 1)∆, T ]. Then the value function is specified by
. Limit buy orders and limit sell orders are never the optimal choice if ε l < p(ε m + 3k + pk). Take for example limit buy orders. At each time t i , they are the optimal choice if and only if the inventory x satisfies
For such x to exist, one must have
The same condition also applies for the existence of limit sell orders. Since the above condition neither depends on time, nor on the strategy followed thus far, we may regard it as an intertemporal and strategy-independent condition. Following an analogous procedure, we find that the above conditions ensure the existence of limit sell orders, too. In Figure 1 , we plot the value function obtained by the recursive relation given above. In Figure 2 , we show that the condition ε l < p(ε m + 3k + pk) ensures that limit orders are the optimal choice when the inventory satisfies Equation (4.1). In particular, this means that limit orders are optimal if the penalty for trading in the lit pool by means of limit orders does not exceed the quantity p(ε m + 3k + pk) as in Figure 2 (a) . On the contrary, in Figure 2 (b) we note that an optimal combination of market orders and dark pool activity outperforms limit orders and thus the latter are never the optimal choice. We assume that [z = 0] = κ (z 0 ) and [z = 1] = κ (z 1 ) = 1 − κ (z 0 ). This reflects the fact that the filling-probability of a limit order depends on how far from the mid-price such an order is posted. The associated QVI is
Given the form of the terminal condition, we consider the ansatz V (t, x, y, s) = y + xs + h(t, x) with terminal condition h(T, x) = −k|x|−ε m . We refer to Cartea & Jaimungal (2012) and Cartea et al. (2014) for more details about this ansatz. We then get: As one would expect, as the inventory increases, the dark pool will first resort to limit orders and ultimately to market orders. We note that when posting a limit order, the smaller the inventory, the farther from the mid-price the market maker posts. A pre-specified non-zero inventory would produce a shift in the optimal boundaries by an equal amount. Moreover, the symmetry in Figure 3 is due to the particular choice made for the frequency of orders submitted by the clients to the dark pool. That is, by choosing λ a = λ b , we would loose such a symmetry and see a shift upwards (resp. downwards) of the optimal boundaries when λ a < λ b (resp. (λ a > λ b ). To solve the QVI, finite difference methods were applied.
We now replace assumption (d) with (d') the dark pool optimally chooses the commissions δ a ∈ δ a − , δ a
The QVI now reads:
In Figure 4 we plot the numerical solution of (4.2). In Figure 4 we see that when the inventory is relatively small, it is optimal to set δ a = δ a − and δ b = δ b − so to encourage the arrival of dark pool orders. Then, for example, when the inventory increases, the incentive is lowered to δ a = δ a + and δ b = δ b − . If the inventory increases further, δ a = δ a + and δ b = δ b + is preferred since the dark pool must increase the commissions to avoid reaching the threshold at which it will need to place orders in the lit pool. The critical inventory level at which the dark pool begins placing orders in the lit pool falls as the terminal liquidation date is approached. Finally, we observe that the situation is symmetric when the inventory is negative, i.e. the commissions increase as the inventory decreases and the lit pool thresholds shrink near the terminal date. In the last simulation, we remove assumption (i) and replace it with (i') a stochastic bid-ask spread is introduced.
For the ansatz V (t, x, y, s; k) = y + xs + h k (t, x), the system of QVIs can be reduced to In Figure 5 we note that as the spread increases, the lit pool thresholds decrease. In fact, the market maker tends to resort to the lit pool earlier in order to avoid holding a large inventory at time T , which will indeed be very expensive to dispose of.
Concluding remarks
In the present work we study an optimal market-making problem faced by a dark pool.
The dark pool earns the commission fee from executing the trade orders within the pool placed by its clients. The market agents, who trade through the dark pools, benefit from anonymity and advantageous prices. Throughout the activity the pool faces an inventory risk, which can be reduced (i) by controlling the width of the dark pool spread, and (ii) by resorting to the lit pool via both, market and limit orders. The dark pool activity is preferred since it protects from information leakage. Such a feature is modelled via a fixed penalty incurred by the dark pool whenever it submits an order to the lit pool. As confirmed by the numerical results, the dark pool will refrain from placing orders in a lit pool as long as the size of the inventory is relatively small. Whenever a certain level is exceeded, the dark pool resorts to the lit pool by means of limit orders. A limit order is more remunerative though its execution is uncertain. The dark pool can choose the limit price; we find that the more the inventory grows, the closer to the mid-price the dark pool will post. This is reasonable since the filling-intensity of limit orders depends on how far from the mid-price they are posted.
If the inventory becomes critically large, market orders will be preferred instead, which are costly but benefit of sure execution. When the end of the market-making activity approaches (which, e.g., might be thought of as the end of the trading day) the market-orders region in the lit pool widens while the dark-pool and limit-orders regions in the lit pool diminish. In fact, the market maker will incur in a higher penalty by liquidating a large inventory at the (c) |x| 2 − |x + Λ(ξ, x)| 2 > 1, for all ξ ∈ and x ∈ X , X ;
(vi) g : [0, T ] × X , X → satisfies Lipschitz continuity
for all t 1 , t 2 ∈ [0, T ] and x 1 , x 2 ∈ X , X ;
(vii) U : × → satisfies Lipschitz continuity and the linear growth conditions
Since [θ * m − t m ]δ/h m → 1 as m → ∞, we get δ/2 ≤ 0, which contradicts δ > 0. Proof. Let v = v * and u = u * be a supersolution and a subsolution respectively. We first prove that there exists a ζ-strict supersolution, where 0 < ζ < ε l . We refer to, e.g., Seydel (2009) for technical details. We consider the function v ζ (t, x ; k) = v(t, x ; k) + ζe β(T −t) (1 + |x| 2p ),
Strong Comparison
where β > 0 and p > 1 are to be determined later. Then we have:
where the last inequality follows form the supersolution property of the function v. Furthermore, by assumption (v) for the function Λ, we have Finally we take into consideration the PIDE part. We let φ ζ be the test function for v ζ . Then φ := φ ζ − ζe β(T −t) (1 + |x| 2p ) is the test function for v. We therefore have: (t, x ; k) ). We define the auxiliary function Ψ ε by Ψ ε t 1 , t 2 , x 1 , x 2 ; k := u m t 1 ,
